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LIBERALS AND BALANCING
ROBERT F. NAGEL*
I think Professor Sullivan is right. That is, I agree that it can
make some difference whether judges employ balancing tests instead of
categorical tests. It makes a difference to litigators because it affects
how they present their arguments and also, to some extent, it affects
their likelihood of prevailing. It makes a difference to the public be-
cause it affects how we understand the courts' conclusions. And I
think it makes a difference to the judiciary as a complex institution
because it affects how much discretion justices and also lower court
judges feel that they have.
I would, however, be less tentative and less speculative than Pro-
fessor Sullivan. I believe that what she is talking about so carefully
and with such restraint was in fact fully demonstrated by the remarka-
ble history of the Burger Court. In area after area, that Court pursued
a balancing approach. The result was--despite dire predictions at the
beginning that the Burger Court would be conservative and re-
strained-a remarkably liberal and activist record. Under the Burger
Court, for the first time whole prison systems were found to be uncon-
stitutional under a newly developed "conditions of confinement" the-
ory of the Eighth Amendment,' and prisons in something close to
forty states were radically altered as a result.2 For the first time, the
Court undertook systematic oversight of public aid programs to paro-
chial schools.' A right against sexual discrimination was made a sig-
nificant part of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 Vast programs of school
busing were authoritatively approved by the Court and imposed on
many school districts.5 Free speech protections were extended to cor-
porations6 and prison inmates,7 and the concept of speech itself was
expanded to include commercial advertising,8 campaign expendi-
* Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Colorado.
1. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
2. Malcom M. Feeley & Roger A. Hanson, The Impact of Judicial Intervention on Prisons and
Jails: A Framework for Analysis and Review of the Literature, in COURTS, CORRECTIONS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 13 (John J. DiIulio ed., 1990).
3. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
4. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
5. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
6. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
7. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
8. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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tures,9 exotic dancing,1" and so on. I think much of this record can be
traced to the fact that the Burger Court saw its role, in many if not
most situations, as a matter of balancing interests, and often the bal-
ance turned out to favor the expansion of individual rights and of judi-
cial power.
So, I do not think Professor Sullivan needs to be quite as tentative
as she is in stating her thesis. If the Burger Court could have turned
out in the astonishing way that it did, there is no doubt more potential
in the Rehnquist Court than is commonly thought today. I hear her
saying that if she can't have Justice Brennan, she will take Justice
Blackmun; if she can't have Justice Blackmun, she will try to turn
Justice O'Connor into a Blackmun.
Here again, I would go further than Professor Sullivan does. Jus-
tice Blackmun, as you might recall from early cases in his career, such
as Wyman v. James," was a quintessential balancer. And he remains
a balancer-at least in terms of his self-conscious legal philosophy-to
this day. But something did change for him over the years. What
changed can be understood by thinking about his great contribution,
Roe v. Wade.'2 What changed was that he became, not careful and
incremental, but bold and ambitious. True, he continues to balance in
the sense that he regards almost every conceivable kind of conse-
quence and consideration as legally relevant. In Roe he took into ac-
count the opinions of the AMA, the ABA, and the ancient Romans,
not to mention all the medical, personal, and psychological conse-
quences of unwanted pregnancies for individual women,' 3 but in the
end all this information was never really balanced. The result in Roe
was not a modulated, common law decision of the sort one might asso-
ciate with the kind of ad hoc balancing now practiced by Justice
O'Connor and recommended by Professor Sullivan. The result in Roe,
rather, was a universal formula for resolving every conceivable public
issue regarding abortion. The trimester scheme purported to resolve
in advance virtually all questions related to abortion and in this sense
it did not balance anything: it was an edict, a super-statutory scheme,
not an ad hoc balance.
So what I think Professor Sullivan might have gone on to say is
that not only might balancing win her more cases than categorical
approaches, but that balancing might over time actually devolve into a
9. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
10. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
It. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
12. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).




kind of heightened judicial activism, where at least some of her hopes
for proper social and moral governmental programs might be realized
in rather dramatic fashion.
The interesting question for me is this: Why is it true that liti-
gators like Professor Sullivan are in fact likely to win more from a
conservative Court if that Court is convinced to follow a jurisprudence
of balancing than if it follows a categorical approach? And why does
balancing not only lead to a surprising amount of ad hoc activism, but
even to the possibility of momentous strokes like Roe v. Wade?
Now I suspect that the answer to this question that Professor Sul-
livan would prefer goes like this: The advantage of balancing is that it
allows for a full examination by the Court of all factors, and the more
factors the Court looks at, the more likely that Court is to decide in
favor of Professor Sullivan's clients. Or, to put it more generally, a
rich consideration of all the relevant factors will naturally tend to lead
to the expansion of individual rights because such an expansion is sim-
ply the moral thing to do.
But if all the factors are fully considered, why don't those factors
that favor Professor Sullivan's opponents also become more sharply
understood, more persuasive? Why should balancing lead to any kind
of inherent advantage for rights claimant? Why wouldn't it be equally
likely that considering all the factors will lead at least half the time to
decisions favoring the restriction of rights and the expansion of gov-
ernmental authority? After all, government can, at least some of the
time, accomplish some very worthwhile objectives; moreover, at least
some of the time those who assert individual rights claims demand
prerogatives that aren't really all that morally attractive. (I'm think-
ing, for example, of the claimants in the recent Dial-a-Porn case,14 or
in the flag-burning case,15 or the Nazis who planned to march through
Skokie, 6 or those who demand school busing programs even when
substantial segments of the affected black community oppose those
programs 7) It can't really be assumed that rights claimants always,
or even necessarily half the time, have the simple moral equities on
their side, so why should balancing tend to lead to an expansion of
rights as it undoubtedly did during the Burger years?
I can think of a number of answers:
First, balancing leads to relative activism only in comparison to
14. Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
15. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
16. Skokie v. Nat'l Socialist Party of America, 373 N.E.2d 21 (111. 1978).
17. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
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conservative categorical adjudication. Professor Sullivan would not
advocate balancing if the Court were still dominated by Justice Bren-
nan. O'Connor's approach might provide Professor Sullivan with
more litigation opportunities than, say, Justice Scalia's approach, so
Professor Sullivan's cautiously sanguine view of judicial balancing has
to be understood as a fall-back position.
Second, adjudicatory balancing does not equally favor the govern-
ment and the rights claimant. It tends to favor the individual. Re-
member, the Court is the place where grievances against the
government are made. If you sit on the Supreme Court, you sit on an
elevated grievance panel; you are always hearing about how the gov-
ernment misbehaved or went too far or simply messed up. Adjudica-
tion is not the occasion for celebrating all the times that a policy did
work well or an official performed exactly as he was supposed to do.
So after a while, I think balancers who sit on the Court are likely to
develop a distrust of government, to be skeptical of official claims, and
to be sympathetic to individual grievances. This certainly happened to
Justice Blackmun over the years.
Remember also that the dynamics of adjudication tend to select
out normal cases, so that the balance between the individual and the
state is almost always determined in a setting of extreme facts. And
the extreme facts to be used are usually under the control of the plain-
tiffs (or rights claimants). Thus, rights advocates normally choose as
the occasion for a test case the worst prison in the most miserable state
in the country. Of course, the principle extracted from this atypical
circumstance is then applied willy-nilly across the country.
Note that the importance of governmental policies is evaluated by
judges with a kind of tunnel vision. This narrowed perspective is cre-
ated as a necessary consequence of having to decide one case at a time,
of having to evaluate a particular statute or program in isolation from
all other associated policies and programs. Any particular govern-
mental policy can be made to seem unnecessary or unimportant or
even senseless if it is detached from the institutional and social web
that gives it meaning. The result is to systematically favor individual
interests over collective interests.
Finally, remember that many of the reasons that argue against
expanding individual rights are abstract reasons. They involve con-
cepts like separation of powers, federalism, and democratic accounta-
bility. These concepts are important, but their importance is based in
large measure on theoretical considerations. These considerations do
have real world consequences but often only in the long run and only
in a diffuse or systemic way. In lawsuits, these structural considera-
[Vol. 63
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tions come into conflict with highly individualized claims of right, and
at each such juncture, it is likely that the structure will seem basically
secure and (in any event) rather an abstract matter, while the individ-
ual's interest is likely to seem concrete, immediate, and in jeopardy.
Now, of course, it is possible for a jurist to resist all the institu-
tional pressures that I've mentioned-pressures that, especially in the
free-floating world of balancing, tend to favor the expansion of rights.
But such resistance requires strong philosophical orientation; it re-
quires an intellectually sophisticated understanding of institutional
and jurisprudential considerations, an understanding that goes far be-
yond attention to the consequences of the immediate case at hand.
So, in closing, I would like again to go beyond what Professor
Sullivan says and suggest that her preference for balancing helps to
explain an oddity of recent politics. A few years ago, you no doubt
recall that strong academic lawyers-very powerful intellectuals such
as Ronald Dworkin and Laurence Tribe--fervently opposed the nomi-
nation of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court despite Bork's academic
and intellectual distinctions."8 The opposition from within the legal
academy, however, died down and essentially disappeared when far
less intellectually distinguished nominees were put forward-I am
thinking of Anthony Kennedy and David Souter. In Souter's case,
academics didn't especially oppose him, even though he had almost no
record and stood essentially for nothing. In Kennedy's case, intellec-
tual academics did not oppose him even though his answers to the
Judiciary Committee suggested, to say the least, an undeveloped,
mushy legal philosophy. Oddly, however, some of the old opposition
reappeared recently when Clarence Thomas's name was put for-
ward.19 This man does have a public record, he does appear to stand
for something, he has even written a little about jurisprudential mat-
ters. Thomas appeared at the time to be an impressive individual, and
his confirmation would have the advantage of keeping a black Justice
on the Supreme Court-both of these factors would have presumably
inclined the academic elite towards at least grudging approval. So
why did strong opposition reappear? The answer suggested to me by
Professor Sullivan's paper is this: If academic litigators cannot have a
Court dominated by people like Justice Brennan, if they are going to
have to rely on the more modest advantages inherent in a judicial com-
mitment to balancing, then it is important that judges with weak or
18. See 133 Cong. Rec. 513116 (daily ed. Sept 30, 1987) (The Nomination of Robert H. Bork to the
Supreme Court: Statement of Sen. Cranston).
19. I am referring here to the critics who, attacking Thomas's writings on such subjects as natural
law, opposed his nomination before Professor Anita Hill's allegations became public.
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nonexistent political and legal philosophies be put on the Court. Such
people will lack the intellectual structure to resist the inherent pres-
sures of adjudicatory balancing; they will be the most affected by the
immediacy of the case and the power of the litigator's argumentation.
The factual, the personal, and the immediate will move them because
they will have fewer resources of their own to cause them to consider
theoretical or institutional or long-run considerations.
They will, in short, be most under the influence of the academic
litigator. And so it is, I think, that highly intellectual lawyers have
developed a stake, not only in balancing, but also in intellectual medi-
ocrity on the Court. These two together might well-as the Burger
Court did so dramatically-serve the academic litigator's political and
philosophical agendas.
